John
Fitzgerald Kennedy, because of his assassination thirty years ago, has gone
down in history as the president who could do no wrong. However, in the early
months of his administration, Kennedy found it necessary take total responsibility
for an embarrassing `failure' in United States' foreign policy. Kennedy's
reaction to the disaster at the Bay of Pigs was to ask "How could I have
been so stupid to let them go ahead?" (1). Yet the plan to arm and equip a
group of Cuban exiles in an attack on their homeland was a policy that he
inherited from his predecessors, President Eisenhower and Vice President
Richard Nixon. Blame for the plan's failure has also fallen on the Central
Intelligence Agency. There is also the fact that the dispute between America
and Fidel Castro nearly led to atomic war in October 1962.
The Batista government in Cuba collapsed after the United States had
vetoed any further arms shipments to that tyrannous government. Fidel Castro,
leader of the guerrilla opposition, did not have to win an armed battle, since
Fulgencio Batista and many of his followers fled the country at the end of
1958. Castro was a popular figure, and as Smith writes, "Increasing
numbers of Americans... were looking for a `good revolution' to embrace to
prove that the United States really did support social and economic
reforms" (2). Hence, the American government did not hinder private
citizens from sending arms and money to the Cuban rebels. During April 1959, he
was invited to America by a group of newspaper editors. This necessitated a
meeting with the executive, in the form of Vice President Nixon. The welcome
was not a warm one. Nixon wrote a famous critical memorandum of Castro; this
cold warrior thought he knew a
(1) Welch p.80.
(2) Smith p.54.
2
Communist
when he saw one. This memorandum was sent to various relevant departments of
the government, along with "a recommendation calling for the organizing of
Cuban exiles to overthrow Castro" (3). This was the first time such an
operation had been suggested, but it took Eisenhower till March 1960 to
implement such a plan; a plan which Kennedy inherited.
It may be, as Kennedy himself pointed out in the 1960 presidential
election, that had the executive chosen to embrace Castro during that first
visit, he would not have been a problem during 1961. The Eisenhower
administration made a number of mistakes which benefited Castro. As former
Ambassador to Cuba Bonsai said: "We did not force [Castro] into the arms
of the Communists, but we were... unwisely cooperative in removing the
obstacles to his chosen path" (4). Castro knew of Eisenhower's planned
invasion with Cuban exiles, and so was forced to take measures to protect
himself. He was also therefore, quite unconcerned by the demands of American
businessmen for compensation for property which he had nationalized. There was
no redress or compensation for their loss in Cuban courts. When Eisenhower cut
the amount of sugar that America would purchase from Cuba, he little realised
that he was persuading Castro to walk up the very path (to Communism) that the
whole American government had been trying to prevent. Sugar was the staple
product of the Cuban economy, and the island's special relationship with
America had always hinged on that product. Now Castro was forced to go
elsewhere to find a market: the USSR. The Eisenhower administration made many
flaws, still basking in the victory of Guatemala in 1954. No one in the
executive truly realised that they were leading Cuba in the opposite direction.
Presidential candidate Kennedy was right to be critical of the
administration in his famous debates with Nixon during the 1960 presidential
campaign. Both candidates competed to
(3) Langley
p.216.
(4) Blasier p.208.
3
create
the toughest stance on Cuba. Kennedy alternatively attacked the administration
for either being too harsh or too weak in dealing with Castro. Nixon, of
course, knew all about the invasion plans, but could not reveal them. As
L.D.Langley wrote, "In view of the disaster that ensued, such
revelations.., might well have saved Kennedy and the nation from the ignominy
of the Bay of Pigs" (5). They would not have been revelations to Castro
anyway. Yet Castro did not expect Kennedy to continue with the invasion:
"on the day Kennedy took office Castro called a halt to the
mobilization" (6). If he did so, then he was deluding himself. Castro
surely would have heard of Kennedy's leading criticism of Eisenhower, that he
had allowed the Iron Curtain "to advance almost to our front yard"
(7).
With hindsight, it is possible to say that "Kennedy felt forced to
make the decision before he was fully acquainted with his major advisers and
firmly established in office" (8). The argument which always arose was
that time was on Castro's side. The more the invasion was delayed, the more
time Fidel had to build up an arsenal supplied by the Soviets. Cuban exiles in
Miami and the Guatemalan training camps were getting restless, and the rainy
season in Cuba was due, etcetera. Smith notes that as late as the 1st of April,
Kennedy was still making changes to the plan. The decision that day was the one
which changed the location of the invasion: the Bay of Pigs was finally decided
upon. The plan had undergone so many changes, especially under the guidance of
the CIA, that its original concept was hardly recognisable. It had become a
World War II amphibious operation. One and a half thousand Cuban exiles were
supposed to rout a well-equipped army of two hundred thousand. Even allowing
for the desired mass desertion from Castro's ranks, the whole plan was doomed
from a numerical point of view.
Richard Bissell, head of CIA covert operations, was the
(5) Langley
p.218.
(6) Langley p.221.
(7) Welch p.65.
(8) Blasier p.201.
4
`mastermind'
of the operation. It is true to say that the CIA made a number of gross errors.
One of the most important was selecting Frank Bender to oversee the plan in
Miami. Bender knew nothing of Cuban history or Latin America, and did not speak
Spanish. He conducted a vendetta against any ...Cuban who criticised him,
especially Manuel Ray. Ray was one of the most prominent of the anti-Castro
Cuban exiles, one who genuinely believed in a free, democratic Cuba. Yet,
because he was one of the few sensible people to criticize the plan, the CIA did
its best to dismantle the MRP, his revolutionary organization. Besides, the CIA
was not designed to conduct large scale invasions, and it was foolish of them
to believe that they could.
There were too many errors in the actual operation to detail here. The
fact is, Kennedy and his advisers should have realised that the plan was
risible. The only person to really speak out was Senator J.William Fulbright.
Objections were raised by people such as Abram Chayes and Arthur Schlesinger,
but they did not really push their point across. One of the most crucial
decisions was supposedly Kennedy's cancellation of the second air strike
against Castro's air force. The first raid had not worked because the rebels
had been using dilapidated B-26's. The logic behind this being that if the
planes were disguised, then nobody would know of U.S. involvement. This is the
reason why Kennedy did not support the invasion with more American firepower,
when the exiles mistakenly believed he would. Yet it was painfully obvious that
America was involved. One consequence was that the credibility of Adlai
Stevenson in New York was destroyed when he related the cover story to the
United Nations. America's involvement was discovered; perhaps Kennedy should
have gone all the way. He was certainly advised to by some of the military. As
R.E.Welch wrote, "Kennedy did not make his decision in a vacuum but rather
in an organizational context which made inevitable
5
his
approval" (9).
The Bay of Pigs only served to prove Castro's strength. Langley notes
that "the real battle was for the loyalty of the Cuban people. This battle
Castro won" (10). It helped Castro's assertion that he needed Soviet aid,
something which led to the Missile Crisis. Kennedy was entirely responsible for
the operation, but it is doubtful that any other president would have acted
differently. Castro was determined that Cuba be no longer dependent on
America. Perhaps such humiliation was necessary. It was a far more cautious and
aware Kennedy who took the initiative against the Cuban Missiles. Not only was
the failure perfect, but it was critical, if it affected the behaviour of a
president responsible for defusing an atomic incident.
(9)
Welch p.72.
(10) Langley p.225.
6
Bibliography
The
Hovering Giant by C.Blasier (1976).
The
United States and the Caribbean in the 20th Century by L.D.Langley (1985).
Response
to Revolution. The United States and the Cuban Revolution by R.E.Welch.
The
United States and the Latin American Sphere of Influence Vol.11 by R.Freeman
Smith (1983).
The
Making of the Missile Crisis by H.S.Dinerstein (1979).
The
Cuban Missile Crisis by Abram Chayes (1974).
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