American Decision Making During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

A Dissertation by Kevin Patrick Mahoney.

Student no: 9190771
Supervised by David Weigall
Abstract

This dissertation examines the deliberations of the American government during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. Much has been written on this subject by those involved, either within the decision making process, or on the periphery - for instance, McGeorge Bundy, Abram Chayess, Raymond Garthoff, Ray Cline, and Robert Kennedy. However, none of these totally agree on what happened. Many myths have been related to events in the missile crisis, and it is the aim of this dissertation to dispel those myths and theories which are clearly inaccurate. The more fantastic myths are ignored here.
The Introduction conveys what events led to the crisis, and how the missiles were discovered when they were. It also involves a discussion of Kennedy’s personal responsibility for the crisis. Chapter one has a lengthy examination of why the Kennedy administration felt forced to act. It also introduces the Excom (for membership see Appendix 1) and explains why there was no use of force during the first week. The role of law in the crisis is examined In regard to the institution of the naval blockade.
Chapter two considers what occurred during the international crisis of the second week, and the actions Kennedy took to maintain control. The way that the American government sought support for their actions from international organizations, is also considered. It questions whether the crisis’s resolution was really effective. Chapter three aims to promote a better understanding of the decisions made by placing them in context with those made during the Berlin blockade of 1948-9. The role of domestic politics is divulged in both crises. Finally, the conclusion asserts reasons for Kennedy’s refusal to use force.

Contents

(1) Glossary of Initials p.1

(2) Introduction: The Origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis p.1

(3) Chapter one: The Options p.6

(4) Chapter two: The Human Factor and the Resolution of the Crisis p.18

(5) Chapter three: The Cuban Missile Crisis in relation to the Berlin Blockade of 1948-9 p.28

(6) Conclusion p.38

(7) Appendix 1: The Members of Excom p.43

(8) Bibliography p.44

Glossary of Initials

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COMOR Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance