Why is it so difficult to arrive at a fair assessment of the career of John Redmond in Irish politics? by Kevin Patrick Mahoney

 

In most accounts, especially George Dangerfield's, John Redmond comes over as the most unfortunate figure. It is not easy to provide a just account of his life, for one cannot get away from the fact that John Redmond failed in his main objective. The alternative that springs to mind is Sir Edward Carson - he desired the retention of the Union for the whole of Ireland, but did not succeed (1). Dangerfield feels that any attempt to tell the life story of our subject here would require a Herculean effort - "no one but an Irishman of genius can do justice to Mr Redmond" (2).
 As with anybody, the reasons why John Redmond succeeded or failed have much to do with the man himself, as much as the time in which he lived. And in that time, when he was the leader of the Irish Parliamentary party, it was he who most of Ireland supported. As F.S.L.Lyons wrote: "For the great mass of those whose political hopes for the future were summed up in the programme of Home Rule, the old parliamentary party held the centre of the stage"(3). True enough, the fact that they did so was reliant on a number of factors. One of the most important was the influence of the Boer war. The sight of Dutch rebels fighting so hard for their future was an impetus for the Irish parliamentary party to heal the wounds which had long festered since the split over Parnell. It was John Dillon who suggested that

 

(1) Lyons p.299.
(2) Dangerfield p.355.
(3) Lyons p.256.
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Redmond become the chairman - precisely because he came from the weaker, Parnellite section of the party. And Redmond performed that role of chairman quite well.
 As Lyons says, he showed as chairman of the party "a highly developed flair for consensus politics" (4). So, there were never more than twelve outcasts from the party at any time from 1900. Nevertheless, your Healys and your William O'Briens could inflict a fair amount of damage if they so desired; for instance, Healy had the support of that stern man, William Martin Murphy, owner of the Irish Daily Independent, who attacked his enemies to the point that "this constant nagging... affected the party's popularity, with ultimately dire results" (5). However, it was not they who had wholly obliterated the Irish party by 1918.
 It does very much seem that whatever Redmond did to reduce the obstacles in the way of Home Rule, he could never succeed, for as soon as he would have got rid of one, another would appear in its place. For years the House of Lords had held back Home Rule, (such as in 1893),  defeating the Bill in the Upper House when it had passed in the Commons. When this constitutional barrier was removed by the Parliament Act of 1911, the Ulster Unionists simply reacted by resorting to force (6). It has also been argued that Redmond was a victim of time, that if ever Home Rule had a chance of succeeding, then that chance had been in the 1880's.
 By 1900, parliamentarians of both sides had already faced Home Rule twice, and had formed their opinions of it. Morton writes that "Conservative opposition... was much more articulate and better organised in 1910 than it had been in 1886" (7). Parnell's tactic had been to force either party to accept Home Rule, by giving or denying power to either one. In 1900, his idea no longer had such validity. Redmond's freedom of choice was severely limited by the fact that one of the parties - the Unionist

 

(4) Lyons p.257.
(5) Lyons p.259.
(6) Morton p.59.
(7) Morton p.56.
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was firmly opposed to Home Rule by its very nature. It would make no sense for Redmond to force a Liberal government out of power. Thus, this diminished the prospect of the Liberals taking such a threat seriously.
 Yet Redmond did not discard Parnell's policy. Indeed, he was the last one to do such a thing, considering that he had first come to public prominence by his defence of Parnell's leadership. When the Liberals won the 1906 election, they had such a large majority that it mattered little whether the Irish party voted against them. Indeed, the only time that the Irish party ever really threatened to do so was over the 1909 People's Budget and its outrageous demands on the Irish liquor industry. As Mansergh wrote,"To threaten and then conform... was ill advised"(8). Redmond, it is true, had little choice on the Budget, for with the House of Lords' reaction to it, there was created a constitutional crisis.
 The question that Mansergh asks is: "did he not also lack that element of luck, which, as Napoleon confessed, decides most battles?"(9). On the other hand, one could argue that Redmond was an extremely fortunate man. One of the main issues in the constitutional crisis was Home Rule. Mansergh writes that in "1909 the cup was filled when the Lords, disregarding the opinion of the more statesmanlike Unionist leaders, decided to follow Lord Milner's advice, to reject Lloyd George's budget" (10). Here was the opportunity that Redmond had been waiting for. In the general elections of 1910, the Fates seemed to absolutely smiling at the Irish party leader, for both these contests produced hung parliaments, with the Irish party holding the balance of power. It very much seemed as though Redmond had finally got his prize.
 This may be why it is so difficult to give a fair assessment of Redmond's career, for he, unlike Parnell, had succeeded in getting Home Rule on the statute book. To have

 

(8) Mansergh p.21. (Unresolved Question)
(9) Mansergh p.48. (Modern Ireland)
(10) Mansergh p.42. (Modern Ireland)
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been so fortunate, and to still fail, was unforgivable. Parties dependent on getting the balance of power always have to be aware that sometimes all the mathematical sums come to nothing in reality. As Hartingdon had pointed out, neither of the main two parties had to become slaves of the Irish MPs (11). Perversely, Sir Edward Carson was seen as a hero by Southern Nationalists by defying Parliament with force, and they promptly copied him by setting up the Irish Volunteers.
 Once this had happened, Redmond was lost. The battlefield had moved from his stronghold of Westminster, and its generals were using different tactics. Redmond, in order to have some kind of control over the Volunteers, forced the provisional committee to accept twenty five of his supporters on it. This caused much resentment, and only led the republicans to quietly retain the strings of power. Thus, they did things without Redmond's knowledge and weakened his position. One instance of this was the gunrunning which led to the massacre at Bachelor's Walk. Redmond was not helped by the weakness of Asquith, who indulged greatly in his tendency of backing down before threats, although this is not to dismiss the fact that they were quite serious ones.
 McCafferty notes that during "1912-1914 many men in the upper echelons of the military establishment conspired to defeat the parliamentary process" (12). The Liberal prime minister was understandably more amenable to compromise when faced with an army whose officers would not obey his commands (such as those at Curragh) and when the Unionists contemplated voting against the annual Army Act in the Lords (13). The main reason why Asquith did not act with more force to assert his authority was because he needed the support of the army in the face of the impending conflict on the Continent.
 The timing of the First World War was extremely unfortunate for Redmond. His response was to pledge all the armed forces

 

(11) Mansergh p.21 .(Unresolved Question)
(12) McCafferty p.153.
(13) Lyons p.307.
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of Ireland, both North and South, to Ireland's defence, so that the English regiments there could fight on the Continent. Redmond, for his part, could never shake off his romantic attachment to the British empire, an empire which the Irish had helped to build. Perhaps this was his main fault: he never believed in total separation from Britain.  As has been written, "It had been shown that men would die for a sovereign nation. But who would throw away his life for cautious Devolution?"(14). The rebellion of 1916 was the last nail in the coffin for the Irish party, for thence was the legend of Sinn Fein created. This did not appear to be so, for Asquith visited Dublin in his determination to find a solution. However, Arthur Griffith's belief that the parliamentary process was "degrading" (15),was never more true than in the negotiations which followed. Lloyd George attempted to forge Home Rule from negotiations which told Unionists one thing, and told Redmond another (16). With this, the Irish could no longer negotiate at Westminster. Redmond himself must have realised, during those last days of 1918, the truth of Dillon's epitaph to him: that he had faced a task "beyond human powers" (17).

 

(14) MacDonagh p.80.
(15) Mansergh p.47.(Modern Ireland)
(16) MacDonagh p.80
(17) Mansergh p.19. (Unresolved Question)
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Bibliography

 

Home Rule and the Irish Question by Grenfell Morton (1980).

 

Ireland by Oliver MacDonagh (1968).

 

The Strange Death of Liberal England by George Dangerfield.

 

Ireland Since the Famine by F.S.L.Lyons (1971).

 

The Irish Question 1800-1922 by L.J.McCafferty (1968).

 

John Redmond by Nicholas Mansergh, in The Shaping of Modern Ireland, edited by C.C.O'Brien.

 

The Unresolved Question by Nicholas Mansergh.